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FUTURE INTERESTS-RESTRAINTS ON ALIBNATION-VALIDITY OF PRE-EMPTIVE 
PROVISION-Defendant purchased a strip of land lying between his residence 
and the plaintiff's for $2,550. Immediately thereafter and pursuant to 
a prior understanding, he conveyed the west half to plaintiff for one 
half the price he paid for the entire tract. As a part of this transaction 
it was agreed that should either party desire to sell his portion of the lot at 
any time in the future, he would first offer it to the other at its original 
cost plus any amounts expended for improvements. When defendant 
was offered $3,500 for his half seven years later, he disregarded this agree-
ment and accepted the offer. Plaintiff's action for specific performance of 
the contract was dismissed. On appeal, held, affirmed. Although the 
arrangement does not violate the rule against perpetuities, it is neverthe-
less void as a direct restraint on alienation. Kershner v. Hurlburt, (Mo. 
1955) 277 S.W. (2d) 619. 
Pre-emptions, or "first refusals," differ from ordinary options be-
cause they are not exercisable until the owner of the property decides to 
sell it.1 Upon the happening of this event the holder has a reasonable 
time in which to decide whether or not he wants to purchase.2 Basically, there 
are two kinds of pre-emptions.3 In one type the holder is preferred 
if he matches a third party's bona fide offer which is acceptable to the 
owner; in the other, as typified by the principal case, the pre-emption 
price is fixed at the time the agreement is entered into.4 Since the price-
matching variety does little more than add a potential buyer, its restraint 
on alienation is negligible and seemingly should be permitted.5 However, 
because a pre-emption involves a contingent future interest as well as a 
possible direct restraint on alienation, there are decisions in which the 
rule against perpetuities has been applied to these pre-emptions6 and viola-
1 Something less than actual sale to another person will establish the requisite state 
of mind. Hathaway v. Nevitt, 358 Mo. 202, 213 S.W. (2d) 938 (1948). 
2 5 CORBIN, CoNTRACIS §1197 (1951). 
3 See 4 PROPERTY REsrATEMENT §413, comment a, illus. 1, 2 (1944). 
4 Interesting variations on these types are presented in Concannon v. Haile, 81 Pa. 
D & C. 480 (1952) and Windiate v. Lorman, 236 Mich. 531, 211 N.W. 62 (1926). 
5 See Weber v. Texas Co., (5th Cir. 1936) 83 F. (2d) 807, cert. den. 299 U.S. 561, 57 
S.Ct. 23 (1936); 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.65 (1952). 
6 The use of this rule as the criterion of validity seems unsound because the duration 
of a pre-emption bears no necessary relation to the extent of the burden it imposes on 
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tions of it found. 7 Where the pre-emption is at a fixed price, the degree 
of restraint imposed in a particular situation will be determined by the 
extent to which realizable value exceeds pre-emption price.8 In the interests 
of certainty it has been suggested that the mere insertion of a fixed price 
should render a pre-emptive provision void.9 Under this approach the pro-
vision is viewed solely as a direct restraint and thus its duration is imma-
terial. Only a few of the cases handle the problem in this simple manner.10 
In the others enforceability depends wholly or in part upon whether or not 
the pre-emption involved is construed so as to violate the rule against per-
petuities.11 Although the court in the principal case follows the practice 
of applying both rules, the outcome of the dual tests here is apparently 
unique in the law thus far. The result is a square holding that although 
the pre-emption does not offend the rule against perpetuities,12 it must 
nevertheless be struck down as violative of the rule against restraints.is This 
is a significant step toward recognition that the latter rule should be deter-
minative in the case of pre-emptions. It may be anticipated that it will lead 
ultimately to the conclusion that the rule against perpetuities has no rela-
evancy in this area whatever.14 
There is a dictum in the principal case that the instant provision, 
and in fact any direct restraint not intended to last longer than the period of 
the rule against perpetuities, would be permitted if it were reasonable.115 
A reasonable restraint is defined as one which is imposed for a so-
cially or economically desirable purpose. Kentucky is apparently the 
alienability and also because the rule itself contemplates non-commercial dispositions 
of property whereas pre-emptions are commonly found in connection with commercial 
transactions. Professor Schnebly, writing in 6 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §26.66 (1952), 
objects to the practice and makes the persuasive point that the operation of the rule 
might be overcome in most jurisdictions (assuming the usual case where the right is to 
be conferred on the grantor of the property) merely by the device of phrasing the pre-
emption in forfeiture rather than promiswry terms. This is so because the rule in this 
country, absent statutes to the contrary, is that powers of termination are not subject to 
the rule. See 3 SIMES AND S:i.um, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §1238 (1956). 
7 Saulsberry v. Saulsberry, 290 Ky. 132, 160 S.W. (2d) 654 (1942); Roberts v. Jones, 
307 Mass. 504, 30 N.E. (2d) 392 (1940). 
s In a leading English case, In re Rosher, 26 Ch. D. 801 (1884), the ratio was 5:1 and 
the court held this equivalent to an absolute restraint. Should the value fall below the 
price of the pre-emption, the latter loses both its power to restrain and its economic value. 
9 This is the position taken in 4 PROPERTY RESTATEMENT §413 (1944) and in 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §§26.65, 26.67 (1952). 
10 Two which approximate this approach are DePeyster v. Michael, 6 N.Y. 467 
(1852) and Maynard v. Polhemus, 74 Cal. 141, 15 P. 451 (1887). 
llSee, e.g.: Henderson v. Bell, 103 Kan. 422, 173 P. 1124 (1918); Lewis Oyster Co. v. 
West, 93 Conn. 518, 107 A. 138 (1919); Maddox v. Keeler, 296 Ky. 440, 177 S.W. (2d) 
568 (1944). 
12 The covenant was interpreted as intended to be binding only on the immediate 
parties. Principal case at 623. 
13 Principal case at 626. 
14 See note 6 supra. 
15 The alleged purpose of this restraint, i.e., to prevent the erection of business 
property on the site, was belied by the express allowance for improvements without any 
hint that they be restricted to a particular type. Principal case at 626. 
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only jurisdiction with a doctrine of reasonable restraints presently 
·in force.16 There the standard professedly applied is one of "reason-
able time,'' but it has been pointed out that the purpose of· the restraint 
often influences the results reached.17 Although it seems desirable to allow 
restraints on alienation for some commercial purposes for fairly short 
periods of time, a doctrine of reasonable restraints does not provide an 
adequate means for doing this because it is inherently subject to litigation 
and casts doubt on the status of titles.18 It appears that such exceptions 
could best be handled by statutes drawn to cover only specifically defined 
types of situations. 
Julian Linde 
16 The Kentucky cases are discussed in Roberts, "Future Property Interests in Ken-
tucky," 13 KY. L. J. 186 (1925). 
17Manning, "The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray," 48 HARV. 
L. R.Ev. 373 at 405 (1935). · 
18 See Andrews v. Hall, 156 Neb. 817, 58 N.W. (2d) 201 (1953), the case abrogating 
Nebraska's then existing reasonable restraints doctrine. 
